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Is Bitcoin Prudent? Is Art Diversified? Offering
Alternative Investments to 401(k) Participants
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY
Whether 401(k) plans’ investment menus should feature “alternative”
investments is a fact-driven inquiry applying ERISA’s fiduciary standards of
prudence, loyalty, and diversification. Central to this fact-driven inquiry is whether
the alternative investment class in question is broadly accepted by investors in
general and by professional defined benefit trustees in particular. A similarly salient
concern when making this inquiry is the financial unsophistication of many, perhaps
most, 401(k) participants. Accounting for these considerations, this Article
concludes that REITs, private equity funds, and hedge funds can, with limits, today
be offered as investment choices to 401(k) participants, but that cryptocurrencies
(including Bitcoin), art, and environmental-social-governance (ESG) funds cannot.
These latter investment categories have yet to achieve acceptance among
professional defined benefit trustees and thus are not yet prudent to offer to 401(k)
participants—if they ever will be.
This Article explores each of these five categories as a class. Even if 401(k)
participants should be offered choices within any (or all) of these classes of
alternative investments, particular investments within each class must still be
scrutinized individually for their compliance with ERISA’s fiduciary standards. The
threshold, fact-intensive question that this Article addresses is whether, before
considering specific investments, any generic category of alternative investments
ought to be considered for the menu of choices offered to 401(k) participants.
Answering this question under ERISA’s legal tests of prudence, diversification,
and loyalty requires such fact-driven inquiries as the general acceptability of a
particular category of investments, the trustee’s motivation for embracing such
investments, and the diversification achievable through such investments. While
investment vehicles such as REITs pass these tests, art funds, Bitcoin, other
cryptocurrencies, and ESG funds are not prudent to offer to 401(k) participants
given such investments’ novelty and the failure to date of defined benefit trustees to
widely embrace such investments.
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Hedge funds and private equity funds are, as a factual matter, closer to REITs
in light of the widespread acceptance of these funds by defined benefit trustees.
Consequently, as a class, such funds qualify as prudent for 401(k) menus even if the
trustee would not deploy his personal resources to such funds and even if some
(perhaps many) hedge and private equity funds examined individually fail ERISA’s
fiduciary standards. However, in light of the financial unsophistication of many
401(k) participants, the 401(k) fiduciary who makes hedge and private equity funds
available to participants should limit participants’ ability to make such alternative
investments to protect participants from making undiversified choices.
These determinations may change over time with new factual circumstances,
e.g., a greater acceptance of a particular asset class by investors, including
professional defined benefit trustees as gatekeepers for the 401(k) universe, and the
emergence of robust markets that provide more experience with particular
investment categories. But, the approach is ultimately what counts, as the norms of
prudence, loyalty, and diversification, applied to current facts, govern the
construction of 401(k) investment menus.
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Is Bitcoin Prudent? Is Art Diversified? Offering
Alternative Investments to 401(k) Participants
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY *
INTRODUCTION
1

Today, pension assets are primarily invested in stocks, bonds, cash, cash
equivalents such as money market and stable value funds, and investment funds
including mutual funds, exchange traded funds (ETFs), passive index funds, and
target date funds. In the parlance of the investing community, other assets are
“alternative investments.”2
The question this Article confronts is whether 401(k) participants3 ought to
be offered such alternative investments for their respective retirement accounts.
In particular, this Article explores the legal propriety of making available to
401(k) investors five categories of alternative investments: (a) real estate, (b)
art, (c) Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, (d) environmental-social-governance
(ESG) funds, and (e) hedge and private equity funds.4
Whether 401(k) plans’ investment menus should feature these (and
other) “alternative” investment categories is a fact-driven inquiry applying
*
Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article, he
thanks Professors Ian Ayres, Eric D. Chason, Stewart Sterk, Aaron Wright, and Mr. Bernard S. Sharfman,
Senior Corporate Governance Fellow of the RealClearFoundation. For research assistance, Professor
Zelinsky thanks Victoria Tesone and Andrew Levitan of the Cardozo Class of 2021.
1
While the Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between pension plans and profit-sharing plans
(including 401(k) arrangements), the labor provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) label both kinds of retirement savings plans as pensions. Compare I.R.C. § 401(a)
(discussing “a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan”), with Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (labeling as a “pension plan” any arrangement
“provid[ing] retirement income” or “result[ing] in a deferral of income”). In this Article, I use the term
“pension” in its broader, ERISA sense to capture all forms of retirement savings arrangements including
profit-sharing plans with 401(k) salary reduction features.
2
See, e.g., Anna Hirtenstein, Stock Rally in 2020 Outpaced Luxury Items, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2021,
at B10 (The “asset class” of “alternative investments. . . . includes hedge funds, private equity and more
exotic investments such as classic cars and other luxury goods.”); Tyler Gallagher, How Alternative
Investing Can Improve Your Portfolio, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/theyec/2020/01/31/how-alternative-investing-can-improve-your-portfolio/?sh=66dc482b54aa.
3
For ease of exposition, I use the term “participants” to include participants’ beneficiaries who can
direct the investment of 401(k) assets that they inherit or receive in divorce cases.
4
Other investment categories could be added to this list, including commodities and derivatives. I
chose to discuss these five classes of alternative investments to keep this Article to a manageable length
and to examine alternative investment categories that generate much interest today in the investment
community. The methodology I use in this Article is applicable to other alternative investment categories
as they are considered for 401(k) investment menus.
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ERISA’s fiduciary standards of prudence, loyalty, and diversification.5
Central to this fact-driven inquiry is whether the alternative investment class
in question is broadly accepted by investors in general and by professional
defined benefit trustees in particular. A similarly salient concern for this
inquiry is the financial unsophistication of many, perhaps most, 401(k)
participants. Considering these factors, I conclude that real estate investment
trusts (REITs), hedge funds, and private equity funds can, with limits, today
be offered as investment choices to 401(k) participants, but that
cryptocurrencies (including Bitcoin), art, and ESG funds cannot. These latter
investment categories have yet to achieve broad acceptance among
professional defined benefit trustees and thus are today not prudent to offer
to 401(k) participants.
This Article explores each of these five categories as a class. Even if
401(k) participants can be offered choices within any (or all) of these classes
of alternative investments, particular investments within each class must still
be individually scrutinized for their compliance with ERISA’s fiduciary
standards. The threshold, fact-intensive question that this Article addresses
is whether, before considering specific investments, any generic category of
alternative investments ought to be considered for the menu of choices
offered to 401(k) participants.
In this context, ERISA’s legal tests of prudence, diversification, and
loyalty require such fact-driven inquiries as the general acceptability of a
particular category of investments, the trustee’s motivation for embracing
such investments, and the diversification achievable through such
investments. Investment vehicles such as REITs pass these tests as a
category because REITs have a considerable track record compiled over
sixty years and have achieved broad acceptance, both among general
investors and in the world of defined benefit pensions. In light of this history
and wide acceptance, REITs as a class qualify under ERISA’s fiduciary
standards as objectively prudent and diversifiable investments, which a loyal
fiduciary may, within limits, offer to 401(k) participants.
In contrast, art funds, Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies are not prudent
to offer to 401(k) participants given such investments’ novelty and the
failure to date of defined benefit trustees to widely embrace such
investments. That failure indicates that Bitcoin, other cryptocurrencies, and
art have yet to achieve sufficiently broad acceptance to be objectively
prudent under ERISA for 401(k) purposes.

5
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). ERISA is codified both in the Internal Revenue Code,
Title 26 of the United States Code, and in Title 29 of the United States Code, pertaining to labor laws.
Following conventional practice, I provide for each labor provision of ERISA both its ERISA designation
and its corresponding United States Code designation. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 77–79 (6th ed. 2015); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF
EMPLOYEE PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 19–20 (3d ed. 2012).
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ESG funds, like art and Bitcoin, are not objectively prudent under
present circumstances and therefore are not appropriate as a class for 401(k)
investment menus. Defined benefit trustees have not embraced ESG
investments as an asset category. Insofar as ESG advocates promote ESG
investments to generate social objectives or third-party benefits, such ESG
investments fail ERISA’s fiduciary test of loyalty, which commands an
exclusive focus upon the economic welfare of plan participants. Department
of Labor (DOL) regulations6 reiterate the U.S. Supreme Court’s teaching
that ERISA-regulated funds should only seek “pecuniary” benefits for plan
participants.7 While a particular investment embracing ESG considerations
might generate such financial benefits, ESG investments as such are not
sufficiently accepted in the defined benefit context to be an objectively
prudent investment class for 401(k) purposes. If a particular ESG fund or
investment is an economically appropriate choice for a 401(k) menu, that
propriety is in spite of, not because of, the fund’s or investment’s pursuit of
broader social goals.
Finally, hedge funds and private equity funds are, as a factual matter, closer
to REITs in light of the widespread acceptance of these funds by defined benefit
trustees.8 Consequently, as a class, such funds qualify as prudent for 401(k)
menus even if the trustee would not deploy his personal resources to such funds
and even if some (perhaps many) hedge and private equity funds examined
individually fail ERISA’s fiduciary standards. However, in light of the financial
unsophistication of many 401(k) participants, the 401(k) fiduciary who makes
hedge and private equity funds available to participants should limit
participants’ ability to make such alternative investments to protect participants
from making undiversified choices.
With changed factual circumstances over time, some types of alternative
investments that are today imprudent may become more conventional and
thus prudent, just as today’s prudent investments were once new and
alternative.9 But, there is no guarantee that any particular alternative
investment category will necessarily evolve over time into the arena of
prudence. After four centuries, tulips are still tulips.10
6
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2021). The Biden administration has proposed major revisions to these
regulations. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 86
Fed. Reg. 57,272 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). However, as of today, these
regulations remain on the books.
7
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014) (explaining that “[t]he term
does not cover nonpecuniary benefits”).
8
Gallagher, supra note 2.
9
On the origins and history of the mutual fund industry, see generally MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE
OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW (2d ed. 2011).
10
However, some dissent from the conventional understanding of the tulip craze. See, e.g.,
Christian C. Day, Risky Business: Popular Images and Reality of Capital Markets Handling Risk––From
the Tulip Craze to the Decade of Greed, 133 PENN. ST. L. REV. 461, 463–74 (2008). Cf. Shan Li, Forget
the Stock Market. The Rare-Plant Market Has Gone Bonkers., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2020, 9:54 AM),
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Central to my fact-intensive analysis under ERISA’s fiduciary standards
is the relationship of defined benefit pensions to participant-invested 401(k)
plans. In important respects, these are “like”11 “enterprise[s]”12 as they both
accumulate retirement resources for ultimate distribution to participants. In
other respects, however, they are materially different enterprises. Defined
benefit pensions are typically large agglomerations of capital, managed by
professional fiduciaries for large groups of participants over a long-term
horizon.13 Participant-invested 401(k) plans, by contrast, entail investment
control by rank-and-file employees who are often unsophisticated investors
with shorter time horizons and small accounts to manage.
These similarities and differences indicate that it is imprudent to offer a
particular class of alternative investments to 401(k) participants until that
class has first been widely accepted in the defined benefit universe by
professional trustees as appropriate vehicles for retirement savings.
However, because 401(k) participants are often unskilled investors
managing small accounts, acceptance by defined benefit trustees, while
necessary, is not a sufficient condition for concluding that an investment
class is prudent in the 401(k) context. In particular, it may be necessary to
limit alternative investments in the 401(k) context, given the danger that
unsophisticated 401(k) participants will direct too much of their small
retirement accounts to these alternative investments.
The distinction between defined benefit pensions and 401(k)
arrangements is also relevant to another important issue: whether each
particular fund offered to a 401(k) participant must be internally diversified
or whether single stock (or equivalently undiversified) offerings are prudent
because the 401(k) participant can diversify her account as a whole. The
possibility of poor diversification performance by unsophisticated 401(k)
participants is too great a risk to permit single stock investments (or similarly
undiversified funds) for them, though we can have confidence in the ability

https://www.wsj.com/articles/forget-the-stock-market-the-rare-plant-market-has-gone-bonkers-116004
37284 (explaining that “[t]he 1600s had the Dutch tulip market bubble”).
11
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
12
Id.
13
Though defined benefit plans are not exclusively so. Some smaller defined benefit plans are
established by personal services practices and other small businesses, but, today, the world of defined
benefit plans is one of large, professionally-managed pensions. See Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy
Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,219, 55,230 (Sept. 4, 2020). “In 2017, there were 39,000
small defined benefit plans” defined as “plans with fewer than 100 participants.” Id. at 55,237. However,
the vast majority of defined benefit assets are held by a relatively small number of large defined benefit
plans. “In 2017, there were 1,391 plans with more than $1 billion in assets each. These plans together
represented just 0.2 percent of all pension plans, but held $5.3 trillion in assets, representing more than
one-half of ERISA-covered pension assets.” Id. at 55,234; see also CONSTANTIJN W.A. PANIS &
MICHAEL J. BRIEN, ASSET ALLOCATION OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS 1 (2015),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/analysis/retirement/asset-allocation-of-definedbenefit-pension-plans.pdf (providing that, in 2012, ninety-five percent of all defined benefit plan
participants “[were] in a plan covering more than 1,000 participants”).
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of professional defined benefit trustees to diversify their overall portfolios
using such single stock funds as part of their holdings.
One more introductory observation: A 401(k) trustee might find it
prudent to place investments on a 401(k)-participant menu that the trustee
would personally eschew for her own nonpension portfolio. The task of a
trustee constructing a 401(k) menu is to give participants choices that have
achieved general acceptance and thus are objectively prudent, even if the
trustee would not make such investments for her own personal portfolio. For
example, someone who eschews REITs for his personal investments might
nevertheless, in his capacity as a 401(k) trustee, find it prudent to offer such
funds for a 401(k) investment menu given the broad acceptance of real estate
investments by defined benefit trustees. By the same token, someone who
personally speculates in cryptocurrencies with his own funds should not, in
his capacity as a 401(k) fiduciary, offer such currencies to plan participants,
given the novelty of cryptocurrencies and the failure to date of defined
benefit trustees to embrace them as an investment category.
In the last section of this Article, I address several questions which arise
from my analysis. Among other conclusions, it is not necessary for a 401(k)
trustee to include an investment choice from each prudent asset class,
provided that the options offered to the participants are sufficiently broad
and diversified. A 401(k) fiduciary may, with appropriate limits, make
available alternative investments like REITs and hedge funds, but it is not
mandatory to do so. Moreover, in light of the Internal Revenue Code’s rules
on nondiscrimination, it is legally possible, but not easy, for a 401(k) trustee
to make available alternative investment choices to some more financially
sophisticated participants, but not to other less knowledgeable participants.
In the final analysis, I argue less for the particular classification of
certain asset classes than for the legally correct approach to determining
which asset classes are (or are not) appropriate for 401(k) investment menus.
These determinations may change over time with new factual circumstances,
e.g., a greater acceptance of a particular asset class by investors, including
professional defined benefit trustees as gatekeepers for the 401(k) universe,
and the emergence of robust markets that provide more experience with
particular investment categories. But, the approach is ultimately what
counts, as the norms of prudence, loyalty, and diversification, applied to
current facts, govern the construction of 401(k) investment menus.
I. BACKGROUND
In this Section, I discuss the background against which a fiduciary decides
whether particular categories of alternative investments are appropriate for a
401(k) investment menu. In legal terms, this background includes ERISA’s
fiduciary duties and ERISA’s authorization of participant-directed investing.
This background also includes the similarities and differences between
professional defined benefit trustees and often unsophisticated 401(k)

518

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:2

participants. Finally, this background includes the different ways in which
pension trusts may hold assets, for example, by direct ownership of a
particular asset, by ownership through diversified holding devices such as
mutual funds, and by ownership through financial intermediaries that bundle
assets from among different investment categories.
A. ERISA’s Duties of Prudence, Loyalty, and Diversification
ERISA fiduciaries are bound by the duties of prudence, loyalty, and
diversification, derived from the common law obligations of trustees.14 In
particular, the trustee of a 401(k) plan, which permits participants to invest
the assets of their respective retirement accounts, must ensure that the menu
of investments offered to the participants for their accounts is prudent, is
diversified, and loyally pursues the participants’ interests. These fiduciary
duties apply whether the employer sponsoring the 401(k) plan itself
establishes the menu of investments available to the plan’s participants or
whether the trustee or another plan fiduciary is tasked with selecting that
investment menu.
An employer sponsoring a 401(k) plan with participant-directed
investing can, as part of the employer’s “settlor” functions,15 specify in the
plan document the investments to which the participants can direct their
account balances. In this context, a trustee’s fiduciary duties require her to
continually monitor and evaluate those employer-selected investment
choices. If, during the course of ongoing monitoring, any of those choices

14
Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 528–29 (2015) (“[A]n ERISA fiduciary’s duty is derived
from the common law of trusts. In determining the contours of an ERISA fiduciary’s duty, courts often
must look to the law of trusts.”) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted); see also JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 556 (4th
ed. 2006) (explaining that “ERISA fiduciary law is derived from and patterned on the Anglo-American
law of trusts”). For an overview of the common law fiduciary duties in the context of trusts and estates,
see STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 673–733
(Saul Levmore et al. eds., 6th ed. 2019); Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41, 41–57 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff
eds., 2019).
15
Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 437 (2011) (stating that the employer is “like a trust’s
settlor” when it “creates the basic terms and conditions of the plan”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432, 444 (1999) (describing an employer “acting as the Plan’s settlor” when it decides upon
“the composition or design of the plan itself”); Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996)
(providing that when employers “alter the terms of a plan,” they “are analogous to the settlors of a trust”).
While embraced by the courts, the notion of employers’ settlor functions has been controversial. See,
e.g., Natalya Shnitser, The New Fiduciaries, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 685, 691 (2020); Dana M. Muir, The
Limited Role of Fiduciary Obligation in Employee Benefit Plans, in 2020 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 2.03[1] (David Pratt ed.)
(discussing “the plan settlor doctrine”).
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prove imprudent, the trustee is required to disregard the plan document
designating those investments and terminate those investments.16
A fiduciary’s obligations are substantively the same vis-à-vis 401(k)
investment choices if the employer-approved plan document delegates the
choice of investments to a trustee or another fiduciary, such as an investment
committee, rather than identifies the investments offered to the participants
for their respective 401(k) accounts. In that case, the duties of prudence,
loyalty, and diversification also govern the selection and retention of the
investment menu. Either way, the trustee (or other responsible fiduciary)
must monitor and ensure a menu of investments that is prudent, diversified,
and loyal to the interests of the 401(k) participants.17
In terms of prudence, ERISA requires a fiduciary to:
[D]ischarge his duties with respect to a plan . . . with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims[.]18
In important measure, DOL’s regulations19 cast the fiduciary duty of
prudence in procedural terms. According to these regulations, in discharging
his investment duties, a prudent ERISA fiduciary is one who “give[s]
appropriate consideration” to appropriate “facts and circumstances,”
including “the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain.”20
The Restatement of Trusts similarly highlights the procedural aspects
of a fiduciary’s obligation of prudence.21 Courts have, in this vein,

16
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 421 (2014) (“[T]he duty of prudence trumps
the instructions of a plan document . . . .”); ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (“[A] fiduciary
shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan . . . in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III.”).
17
Hughes v. Northwestern Univ., 142 S. Ct. 737, 740 (2022) (discussing the “duty to monitor all plan
investments and remove any imprudent ones”); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv) (2021) (confirming a
“fiduciary[’s] . . . duty to prudently select and monitor any service provider or designated investment
alternative offered” under any plan providing for participant-directed investing); id. § 2550.404c-5(b)(2)
(confirming a fiduciary’s duty “to prudently select and monitor any qualified default investment alternative
under the plan” in the context of qualified default investment alternatives).
18
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see also LANGBEIN, STABILE & WOLK, supra
note 14, at 556–57 (discussing ERISA’s duty of prudence); Bernard S. Sharfman, The Conflict Between
BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and ERISA’s Fiduciary Duties, 71 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1241,
1258–59 (2021) (discussing the same).
19
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(a), (e)(2)(ii)(F) (2021).
20
Id. § 2550.404a-1(b).
21
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2007) (“The trustee’s compliance
with these fiduciary standards is to be judged as of the time the investment decision in question was
made, not with the benefit of hindsight or by taking account of developments that occurred after the time
of a decision to make, retain, or sell an investment. The question of whether a breach of trust has occurred
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characterized a plan trustee’s ERISA-based duty of prudence as an
obligation about process ex ante, not a guarantee of results ex post.22
However, buttressing its procedural elements, the law of prudence also
has an objective quality. Courts have analyzed the choice of 401(k)
investments by asking whether such choice was “objectively prudent” when
made.23 Even if a fiduciary’s decision making process fails the procedural
test of prudence, a decision is objectively prudent “if a hypothetical prudent
fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”24 As a corollary, an
investment subject to extensive scrutiny will fail the test of objective
prudence if, on the merits, the investment falls outside accepted parameters
for fiduciary decision making.
The fact-intensive notion of “objective prudence” is bolstered by the
Restatement of Trusts, which notes that a trustee’s duty of prudence has
“substantive content”25 and impels “caution”26 and “conservatism”27 when a
trustee makes investments. This substantive emphasis on cautious and
conservative investments is reflected in the DOL regulations, which
condone participant-directed investing. An important theme of those
regulations is that prudent investments for 401(k) plan participants are
investments reflecting “generally accepted investment theories.”28 From this
vantage, even if a fiduciary has proceeded in a careful and deliberate fashion,
her choices are imprudent if they fall outside the parameters of generally
accepted conventions. A key touchstone for objective prudence is whether
the investment comes from a category that is generally accepted, i.e.,
whether, as a matter of fact, the form of the investment is long-standing and
is widely embraced.
turns on the prudence and propriety of the trustee’s conduct, not on the eventual results of investment
decisions. The trustee is not a guarantor of the trust’s investment performance.”).
22
Bunch v. W.R. Grace & Co., 555 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he test of prudence—the Prudent
Man Rule—is one of conduct, and not a test of the result of performance of the investment. Whether a
fiduciary’s actions are prudent cannot be measured in hindsight. . . . The test is how the fiduciary acted
viewed from the perspective of the time of the challenged decision rather than from the vantage point of
hindsight.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).
23
Brotherston v. Putnam Invs., LLC, 907 F.3d 17, 39 (1st Cir. 2018); Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671
F.3d 314, 322 (3d Cir. 2011); Ramos v. Banner Health, 461 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1129 (D. Colo. 2020);
Acosta v. Reliance Tr. Co., No. 17-cv-4540 (SRN/ECW), 2019 WL 3766379, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 9,
2019) (“[T]he duty of prudence is based on an ‘objective’ reasonableness standard . . . .”).
24
Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 363 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Plasterers’ Loc. Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663
F.3d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 2011)); see also Wildman v. Am. Century Servs., LLC, 362 F. Supp. 3d 685, 700
(W.D. Mo. 2019) (“Even if a trustee failed to conduct an investigation before making a decision, he is
insulated from liability if a hypothetical prudent fiduciary would have made the same decision anyway.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roth v. Sawyer-Cleator Lumber Co., 16 F.3d 915, 919 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
25
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2007)
26
Id. § 90 cmt. e.
27
Id. § 90 cmt. e(1).
28
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(e)(4)(i) (2021).
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Thus, in the 401(k) menu context, the objective prudence inquiry should
focus upon the history and acceptance of the investment category under
consideration. If, as a factual matter, an investment category is well-established
and broadly accepted, particularly by professional defined benefit trustees, that
category has become cautious and conservative, i.e., objectively prudent for
401(k) purposes. In contrast, new and novel investments, whatever their
attractiveness in other contexts, are not prudent for 401(k) investment menus.
Reinforcing the objective aspects of prudence is the acceptance of
modern portfolio theory as a benchmark of prudent investing.29 Under that
theory, the prudence of any particular investment is assessed in the context
of the overall portfolio of which that investment is a part. Again, this
indicates that a prudent fiduciary’s decisions are subject not just to
procedural tests of care, but to standards of substantive propriety, as well. In
their critique of high fee funds in 401(k) investment menus, Professors
Ayres and Curtis implicitly invoke the test of objective prudence when they
highlight the “distinction between investment decisions that, as a matter of
market risk, turn out poorly and investment decisions that ex ante can be
expected to underperform.”30 The former may have been prudent; the latter
likely was not.
Under the test of fiduciary prudence, a 401(k) trustee or other ERISA
fiduciary may select for the participants’ investment menu choices that the
trustee, in making her private investing decisions, would eschew for herself.
The test of objective prudence is not that an investment satisfies the trustee’s
personal preferences. The test is whether the investment is substantively
sound, that is, whether the investment is generally accepted31 and therefore
deemed cautious32 and conservative.33
The fiduciary duty of diversification is both an extension of the duty of
prudence and an independent duty in its own right. ERISA captures the
overlapping nature of a fiduciary’s duty to diversify. In statutory terms, an
ERISA fiduciary must “diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so.”34
29
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007) (“What has come to be
called ‘modern portfolio theory’ offers an instructive conceptual framework for understanding and
attempting to cope with nonmarket risk.”).
30
Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees
and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1510–11 (2015).
31
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(e)(4)(i) (2021).
32
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (AM . L. INST. 2007).
33
Id. § 90 cmt. e(1).
34
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C). See also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at
555–57 (discussing ERISA’s duty of diversification); Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 48 (discussing
diversification as an aspect of prudence); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16048 (West 2021) (“[T]he trustee has a
duty to diversify the investments of the trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so.”).
The overlap between the rule of prudence and the requirement of diversification proves important in the
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ERISA’s statutory authorization of investments in “qualifying employer real
property” and in “qualifying employer securities” similarly reflects that
diversification is both a facet of prudence and an independent fiduciary obligation
in its own right.35 As to such employer-related investments, ERISA suspends
“the diversification requirement,” as well as “the prudence requirement,” but
“only to the extent that” the duty of prudence “requires diversification.”36
The courts have been divided as to whether each individual investment
choice in a 401(k) menu should itself be diversified or whether
diversification should be assessed by looking at the entire menu of
investments offered to a 401(k) participant.37 This is an area where the
distinction between defined benefit pensions and 401(k) plans is telling: We
can be reasonably confident that a professional defined benefit trustee,
confronted with a single stock fund or an equivalently nondiversified
investment choice, will diversify her overall portfolio with other
investments. We can be less certain that unsophisticated 401(k) participants,
when confronted with the same nondiversified investment alternative, will
build overall properly diversified portfolios for their respective retirement
assets. Given the lack of investment savvy among many such participants,
they may embrace too heavily a single stock or a similarly nondiversified
investment fund. Thus, it is more convincing to understand the fiduciary
requirement of diversification in the 401(k) context as applying to each
choice offered to a 401(k) participant.
ERISA’s duty of loyalty to the plan’s participants is embodied in the
statutory mandate that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to
a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—(A)
for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan.”38 The Internal Revenue Code earlier embraced the duty of loyalty
when it required that qualified plans be operated for “the exclusive benefit

context of my conclusion that prudent 401(k) trustees should limit participants’ ability to invest in certain
alternative investments to prevent such participants from concentrating their assets too heavily in such
alternative investments. See infra pp. 546–47.
35
ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
36
Id.
37
Compare Stegemann v. Gannett Co., 970 F.3d 465, 478 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[A] single fund on a
menu . . . can be scrutinized for imprudence for want of diversification . . . .”) with id. at 487 (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he ERISA duty of diversification requires that a plan’s investments be diversified but
not that each investment be diversified.”). See also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(1) (2021)
(explaining that a participant must be offered “at least three investment alternatives . . . [e]ach of which
is diversified”). See also Schweitzer v. Inv. Comm. of the Phillips 66 Sav. Plan, 960 F.3d 190, 197–98
(5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 706 (2021).
38
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A); see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 14, at
508–09 (discussing ERISA’s duty of loyalty); Sharfman, supra note 18, at 1256–58 (discussing ERISA’s
duty of loyalty).
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of [the employer’s] employees or their beneficiaries.” This statement of
loyalty remains in the Code today.
Construing ERISA’s “exclusive purpose” terminology in Dudenhoeffer,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared that that purpose, which must “be pursued
by all ERISA fiduciaries,” entails the search for “the sort of financial
benefits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments
typically seek to secure for the trust’s beneficiaries.”40 Thus, a loyal ERISA
fiduciary does not seek “nonpecuniary benefits”41 or the welfare of third
parties.42 “The duty of loyalty is analyzed under a subjective standard where
‘what matters is why the defendant acted as he did.’”43
In light of the foregoing, ERISA’s legal duties—prudence, loyalty, and
diversification—require fact-intensive44 inquiries: Is a particular investment
option cautious? Conservative? Generally accepted? Have professional
defined benefit trustees widely embraced this investment category? Is a fund
internally diversified or not? Is a particular investment category novel, or
does it have an established track record? Does a particular investment pursue
the participant’s interests or a third party’s welfare? Answering these
fact-based questions will tell us whether any particular category of
alternative investments is appropriate for a 401(k) investment menu.
B. ERISA Section 404(c) and Participant-Directed Investing
ERISA section 404(c) provides the statutory underpinning for
participant-directed investing of participants’ respective 401(k) accounts.45
Section 404(c) acknowledges that defined contribution plans with their
individual investment accounts may “permit[] a participant or beneficiary to
exercise control over the assets in his account.”46 If a plan provides for such
participant-directed investing and “if a participant or beneficiary exercises

39

I.R.C. § 401(a).
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014).
41
Id. at 421.
42
See also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 405 (2020)
(concluding that “ERISA forbids collateral benefits ESG investing by a pension trustee”).
43
Wildman v. Am. Century Servs., LLC, 362 F. Supp. 3d 685, 700 (W.D. Mo. 2019) (quoting In
re Wells Fargo ERISA 401(k) Litig., 331 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875 (D. Minn. 2018)).
44
See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 42, at 427 (stating that “the prudent investor rule is a
facts-and-circumstances standard”); id. at 448 (stating that prudence “is a contextual and fact-driven
question”). See also Letter from Louis J. Campagna, Chief, Div. of Fiduciary Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, to Jon W. Breyfogle (June 3, 2020), at 3 [hereinafter Campagna Letter] (stating that compliance
with ERISA fiduciary standards “is an inherently factual question”).
45
ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c). On the role of ERISA § 404(c) in the evolution of defined
contribution retirement plans, see EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY:
HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 45–47, 51 (2007).
46
ERISA § 404(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A).
40
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47

control over the assets in his account,” the plan’s trustees (and other
fiduciaries) have no liability “for any loss” resulting from such participant’s
decisions about his account’s investments.48 The DOL regulations under
section 404(c) establish that the trustee or other fiduciary is responsible for
ensuring that the menu of investment options available to the plan’s
participants is “prudently select[ed].”49 Thus, a fiduciary is immunized from
liability only for losses which derive from the participant’s choices within
an acceptable menu, not for the imprudent design of the menu itself.
ERISA section 404(c)(5) extends trustees’ immunity from fiduciary
liability if a 401(k) participant can invest her account but takes no
affirmative action to do so.50 In that case, there is no fiduciary liability if the
retirement assets of the participant automatically go to a “qualified default
investment alternative.”51 Central to the regulatory definition of such a
qualified default investment alternative is compliance with “generally
accepted investment theories.”52 While it raises important interpretative
issues (e.g., How widespread must acceptance be to be “general”?), the
regulation’s emphasis on implementing “generally accepted investment
theories” reinforces a fact-based, objective view of prudence. As the
Restatement of Trusts observes, “an inferred, general duty to invest
conservatively is a traditional and accepted feature of trust law.”53
C. Like Enterprise: Comparing Defined Benefit with 401(k) Plans
ERISA defines prudence in the context of “an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.”54 For these purposes, defined benefit pensions
and 401(k) plans have both important similarities and material differences.
On the one hand, they are “like” enterprises insofar as both defined benefit
plans and 401(k) arrangements accumulate and invest resources for
participants’ retirements. On the other hand, there is a material distinction
between a professional trustee investing large quantities of defined benefit
pension funds over a long time horizon for a sizable and age-diverse
community of pension participants and an employer or trustee constructing
47

Id.
ERISA § 404(c)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(ii).
49
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(iv) (2021). The DOL adopted this regulation in 2010. Fiduciary
Requirements for Disclosure in Participant-Directed Individual Account Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,910,
64,910 (Oct. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). The Ninth Circuit declined to apply this
regulation in Tibble v. Edison International because the events involved in that case predated the adoption
of the regulation. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 729 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013).
50
ERISA § 404(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5).
51
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(e) (2021).
52
Id. § 2550.404c-5(e)(4)(i)(iii).
53
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (AM. L. INST. 2007). See id. § 90 cmts. e–e(1)
(“[A] generally conservative predisposition should continue to prevail in trust investing.”).
54
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
48
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a 401(k) investment menu from which often unsophisticated participants
will make the investment decisions for their own small accounts. What may
be prudent for the former may not be prudent for the latter, given the
differing investment expertise of defined benefit trustees and of 401(k)
participants, as well as the different goals each must pursue.55
A professional trustee for a defined benefit pension might prudently
invest a discrete percentage of the trust funds she controls in alternative
investments in order to provide diversification. Given its longer time
horizon, a defined benefit plan might properly invest in novel, thinly-traded
assets for the long run. At the same time, it would be imprudent to offer these
alternative investments to less sophisticated 401(k) participants since they
may invest too heavily and exclusively in these alternative investments.
Illiquid investments may be particularly inappropriate for an older 401(k)
participant who is relatively close to retirement and therefore in need of
liquid funds to pay his 401(k) distribution.
Consequently, acceptance by defined benefit trustees is a threshold
criterion, which an investment must surmount before being considered
prudent for 401(k) participants. If defined benefit trustees (typically
investment professionals) have not embraced a particular category of
investments for retirement savings purposes, a fortiori that category is not
yet prudent to offer to less sophisticated 401(k) participants who are also
investing for retirement savings purposes. However, even if a specific class
of investments has achieved widespread acceptability among defined benefit
fiduciaries, that class may still not yet pass muster for participant-directed
investing in light of participants’ often minimal investment skills, shorter
time horizons, and the small amounts they invest. At the most basic level, it
may be necessary to limit 401(k) participants’ access to alternative
investments to preclude their overconcentration in those investment
categories, or it may be necessary to bundle those alternative investments
with more conventional assets to ensure the diversification of 401(k)
participants’ portfolios.
D. The Unsophisticated Nature of Many 401(k) Participants
Central to this analysis is the financial unsophistication of many,
perhaps most, 401(k) participants, in contrast to the professionalism of most
defined benefit trustees. Considerations of prudence suggest that defined
benefit trustees should be the gatekeepers for the 401(k) world. An
investment is not generally accepted, and thus not prudent in the retirement
savings setting, until it has been widely adopted in the defined benefit
55

On the differences between defined benefit pensions and 401(k) plans, see ZELINSKY, supra note
45, at 1–2. See also Campagna Letter, supra note 44, at 3 (noting the “important differences between a
fiduciary’s decision to include private equity investments in the portfolio of a professionally managed
defined benefit plan, and the decision to include an asset allocation fund with a private equity component
as part of the investment lineup for a participant-directed individual account plan”).
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universe. However, such adoption, while necessary, is not a sufficient
condition for prudence in the 401(k) context. An investment may be a
prudent choice for professional defined benefit trustees, but not yet
conventional enough and diverse enough for unsophisticated 401(k)
participants. Such participants, not appreciating the benefits of
diversification, may overinvest in alternative assets unless their access to
such assets is limited.
David F. Swensen was among those arguing that rank and file investors
are invariably poor investors.56 “Even with a massive educational effort,” he
warned, “the likelihood of producing a nation of effective investors seems
small.”57 In a similar vein, Professors Ayres and Curtis focused on the “naïve
diversification” pursuant to which many unsophisticated 401(k) participants
direct their respective retirement funds irrationally, e.g., by dividing assets
among similar funds even though one of these funds has significantly lower
fees.58 The consensus among commentators follows these lines: Many, if not
most, 401(k) participants invest poorly.59
These concerns are buttressed by research indicating that many persons
can be paralyzed when they are presented with too much choice.60 This
makes me skeptical of brokerage windows as a means to improve
participant-directed 401(k) investing. Pursuant to such brokerage windows,
the participant is permitted to invest his 401(k) funds in a very broad array
of investments, rather than to invest within a limited menu of choices
selected by the employer or plan fiduciary.61 While some 401(k) participants
may benefit from having myriad investment choices, many, perhaps most,
may choose less wisely when confronted with more choices.
56
DAVID F. SWENSEN, UNCONVENTIONAL SUCCESS: A FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH TO PERSONAL
INVESTMENT 145 (2005).
57
Id. at 4.
58
See Ayres & Curtis, supra note 30, at 1507.
59
See ZELINSKY, supra note 45, at 8–12; see also Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 53, 59–62 (2012).
60
See, e.g., Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 99 (2011) (explaining that, in the context of 401(k) participant investing,
“complexity of choice harmed the quality of choices made as well as willingness to make a choice at
all”). See, e.g., Mark Miller, When Medicare Choices Get ‘Pretty Crazy,’ Many Seniors Avert Their Eyes,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/business/medicare-advantage-retirement.html (Sept.
15, 2021) (describing the popular recognition that many individuals can be paralyzed from decision
making in the face of too much choice).
61
See Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing a brokerage window
“which gave participants access to some 2,500 additional funds managed by different companies”); see
also Schwartz, supra note 59, at 57 (discussing “brokerage window[s]”); Ayres & Curtis, supra note 30,
at 1524 (explaining how a brokerage window “provides access to hundreds or thousands of funds and
even individual stocks that investors can opt to hold”); Albert Feuer, Ethics, Earnings, and ERISA:
Ethical-Factor Investing of Savings and Retirement Benefits, in 2020 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 15, § 6.07 (discussing the
“brokerage option”).
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E. The Different Ways in Which Pension Trusts Hold Assets
Pension trusts can invest in different asset categories in a variety of
ways. These different methods of investing have divergent implications for
401(k) investment menus under ERISA’s test of diversification.
At its simplest, a pension trust may invest directly in an individual asset.
The prototypical direct investment of an individual asset is a pension trust’s
ownership of the stock of a particular company. A pension trust may also
invest in an asset class through an intermediary holding device, often
resulting in a degree of diversification within the holding device. For
example, a trust can invest in a mutual fund holding a group of stocks. Such
a fund facilitates diversification—i.e., ownership of many corporations’
stocks—unlike an investment in a single asset—e.g., ownership of a
particular company’s stock. It is, however, possible for a single stock fund
to hold only the shares of a particular corporation.62
A pension trust may also invest in a vehicle which bundles items from
different asset classes. An example of such a bundled investment vehicle is a
target date fund that invests in different asset categories—e.g., stocks, bonds,
and cash equivalents—thereby changing the composition of the fund’s holdings
from more aggressive to more conservative as the target date approaches.63
In the interests of diversification, a pension trust will often establish
limits on the percentage of the trust’s assets which will be allocated to any
particular investment class or to any particular investment. A pension trustee
may, for example, decide that it wants no more than a particular percentage
of its holdings in any one company’s stock or may limit to a particular
percentage its holdings’ common stocks as a group.64
In the context of a defined benefit trust, it is the professional investment
fiduciary who chooses from among these approaches to investing. In the
401(k) context, the fiduciary considering alternative investments for a
participant investment menu is required to choose more diversified methods
of investments and to limit particular investment categories to prevent
unsophisticated participants from making undiversified investments in
alternative assets.65 Indeed, as to most alternative investments that pass the
test of prudence, the 401(k) menu offering such alternative investments
62

See Stegemann v. Gannett Co., 970 F.3d 465, 470, 475 (4th Cir. 2020) (discussing a single stock fund).
Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961,
2022 (2010) (“[T]arget date funds offer investors professional allocation of their assets by shifting from
an equity portfolio in the early years toward an increasing percentage of fixed income securities both
leading up to and following the target date, a shift that is termed the fund’s ‘glide path.’ As a result, the
funds purport to meet the increasingly conservative investment needs of consumers as they age and
approach retirement.”) (footnote omitted).
64
See Russell Galer,“Prudent Person Rule” Standard for the Investment of Pension Fund Assets,
83 FIN. MKT. TRENDS 43, 55 (2002).
65
See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., MEETING YOUR FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITIES 3 (2020) (noting that the DOL regulations require three different investment options
and sufficient information regarding those options to participants).
63
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should offer these in limited, bundled, and mediated forms to prevent
participants from overinvesting in particular assets and asset categories.
II.ANALYZING SPECIFIC ASSET CATEGORIES
A. Real Estate vs. Bitcoin and Art
Against this background, I first analyze and contrast real estate, Bitcoin,
and art funds as potential 401(k) investments under ERISA’s fiduciary
standards. Under this fact-intensive inquiry, real estate, cryptocurrencies,
and art today represent the opposite ends of the prudence spectrum. Real
estate, in particular REITs, are now long-established, actively-traded, and
widely-accepted investments.66 Defined benefit trustees invest extensively
in real estate. REITs can be diversified devices that resemble traditional
mutual funds. Today, as a class, REITs are conservative and conventional
and therefore are objectively prudent to offer to 401(k) participants. To
guard against overconcentration by unsophisticated investors, REITs should
appear in 401(k) investment menus with limits and/or in internally
diversified forms, e.g., diversified funds of REITs or REITs bundled with
other investments in other asset categories. When so limited and diversified,
REITs are prudent investments to offer to 401(k) participants for their
respective retirement accounts.
In contrast, Bitcoin and art funds are new, thinly-traded investments that
have not achieved wide acceptance in the investment community in general or
among defined benefit trustees in particular. Bitcoin, other cryptocurrencies,
and art funds thus represent the opposite end of the prudence spectrum in that
they are too novel to offer to 401(k) participants today.
At one level, the history of real estate investments can be traced back to
the Bible67 or perhaps to the real estate speculation that was central to
American colonial history.68 More prosaically, the fact-based prudence
inquiry for 401(k) purposes should start with Congress’s authorization of the
REIT in 1960.69
The Internal Revenue Code’s pass-through taxation of REITs is
modeled on the pass-through taxation of mutual funds.70 Over the years,
66
See I.R.C. § 856 (governing REITs). For background information on REITs, see Bradley T.
Borden, Reforming REIT Taxation (Or Not), 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2015).
67
My ancestors, for example, built Pithom and Ramses for the Pharaoh of Egypt, one of the ancient
world’s most aggressive real estate developers. For a recent analysis of this much-told tale, see LEON R.
KASS, FOUNDING GOD’S NATION: READING EXODUS 454 (2021).
68
See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PIONEERS: THE HEROIC STORY OF THE SETTLERS WHO
BROUGHT THE AMERICAN IDEAL WEST 42 (2019) (discussing George Washington’s real estate
speculation in Ohio).
69
Act of September 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-779, § 856(a)–(c), 74 Stat. 998, 1004–05 (1960)
(adding the provisions pertaining to REITs to the Internal Revenue Code).
70
Borden, supra note 66, at 18 (“REIT taxation is modeled after the [mutual fund] tax regime.”).
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REITs have emerged as widely-accepted, heavily-traded investment
vehicles resembling mutual funds. Nareit, a trade association of REITs,
calculates that all REITs today own about $3 trillion in assets, of which
roughly two-thirds is held by publicly-traded REITs.71 For 2014, Professor
Borden put “REIT market capitalization” at “more than $907 billion.”72
Confirming the prudence of real estate investments for retirement savings,
the average defined benefit plan today holds two to three percent of its assets
in real estate.73
A REIT can achieve a measure of internal diversification.74 A REIT can,
for example, hold different kinds of real estate, including commercial
structures, residential structures, office buildings, and apartment buildings.75
A single REIT can also be diversified geographically, holding structures in
different locations.76 Moreover, a REIT can diversify by owning real
estate-related mortgage loans in addition to or in lieu of actual buildings.77
In the interests of diversification, groups of REITs can be aggregated or
bundled with investments in other asset categories.
For all these reasons, real estate and REITs in particular, widely
accepted by defined benefit trustees, are today prudent as an asset class to
offer to 401(k) participants. Within the category of real estate, particular
investments may still be more or less prudent depending upon their
particular features. A REIT with excessive fees or owning a single structure
is not a prudent offering for a 401(k) menu since it lacks internal
diversification. But, as a generic category, REITs today pass the objective
test of prudence. They are conventional, widely embraced, readily traded in
active markets, and reflect the acceptance of real estate as an investment
category by defined benefit trustees.78
REITs are not the only device available for making real estate
investments available to 401(k) participants. Real estate mortgage
investment conduits (REMICs), for example, are another way of holding
interests in real estate.79 But, for 401(k) menus, REITs today are the most
well-established, broadly accepted, diversifiable, and readily available way
71
REITs by the Numbers, NAREIT, https://www.reit.com/data-research/data/reits-numbers#:~:text
=REITs%20own%20approximately%20%243%20trillion,Americans%20all%20across%20the%20cou
ntry (Nov. 2021).
72
Borden, supra note 66, at 6.
73
PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 13, at 6.
74
Though, among economists, the benefits of REIT diversification are a controversial topic. See,
e.g., Zhilan Feng et al., Geographic Diversification in Real Estate Investment Trusts, 49 REAL EST.
ECON. 267, 270–71 (2021).
75
Id. at 271.
76
Id. at 271, 274, 274 tbl.1.
77
I.R.C. § 856(c)(5)(B) (defining, for REIT taxation, “real estate assets” to include “interests in
mortgages on real property”).
78
See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
79
See I.R.C. §§ 860A–860D (establishing tax arrangements of REMICs).
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to make real estate investments available to 401(k) participants for their
retirement savings accounts.80
Once it is decided that, because of their broad acceptance, REITs can
prudently be placed on a 401(k) investment menu, the focus shifts from
prudence to diversification. At this point, the unsophisticated nature of many
401(k) investors becomes a concern. While professional defined benefit trustees
widely invest in real estate,81 we can be confident that they will not
overconcentrate in real property as a class or in any single real estate investment.
In contrast, there is a significant danger that some 401(k) participants will
underdiversify by directing too much of their respective accounts to real estate
as a class or by investing in a particular piece of real property.
Consequently, the most prudent way to offer real estate to 401(k)
investors is as groups of REITs or as part of bundled funds that include
REITs among other asset categories. In addition, or instead, it is also prudent
to limit the percentage of a participant’s account that can be directed to
REITs. Looking at the investment patterns of defined benefit trustees, I
would limit REITs to ten percent of any participant’s account, though I
acknowledge that the exact ceiling is a matter about which reasonable
trustees might disagree. If the portion of any particular account invested in
REITs exceeds the plan’s limit, no further real estate investment should be
permitted until other asset categories in the participant’s account have
appreciated sufficiently to reduce real estate back below the limit.
Besides precluding overconcentration, such a limit also signals to the
participant that, while real estate is a prudent investment, she should
diversify and hold assets from other investment categories, as well.
In contrast to REITs with their sixty-year history, Bitcoin did not exist
before 2009.82 The volume of Bitcoin investments is relatively small,83 and

80

PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 13, at 6.
Id.
82
Eric D. Chason, A Tax on the Clones: The Strange Case of Bitcoin Cash, 39 VA. TAX REV. 1, 4
(2019). For the background and history of Bitcoin, see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT,
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 20–22 (2018).
83
CoinMarketCap is a widely used website that reports cryptocurrency trading and values. On
October 4, 2020, it reported that Bitcoin’s total value was slightly more than $196 billion worldwide,
while Bitcoin’s daily trading value was slightly less than $55 billion. Historical Snapshot - 04 October
2020, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/20201004 (last visited Feb. 2, 2022). See
also Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Is Back Trading Near Three-Year Highs, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-is-back-trading-near-three-year-highs-11604250000 (“[Bitcoin] has
been around for only about 11 years, and for most of that time, it has been ignored by the mainstream and
viewed a curiosity for risk takers. It has no record as a wide-scale asset class.”).
81
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Bitcoin prices are volatile, trading in thin markets. Prominent voices
caution about the speculative nature of Bitcoin.86 New York’s Attorney
General warns that “[v]irtual currency is a high-risk and unstable
investment. Even if you purchase a well-established virtual currency from a
more reputable trading platform, the price could crash in an instant.”87 SEC
Chairman Gary Gensler characterizes cryptocurrency markets as “like the
Wild West.”88
Internal diversification by bundling Bitcoin with other cryptocurrencies
is an unpromising prospect since other cryptocurrencies are even smaller,
newer, and less liquid than Bitcoin.89 Combining other cryptocurrencies with
Bitcoin would produce an even less cautious and conservative package than
Bitcoin standing by itself. Today, rank-and-file U.S. investors must hold
Bitcoin (or any other cryptocurrencies) directly. There is as of yet no

84
Chason, supra note 82, at 2 (recording how the market price of Bitcoin climbed from
approximately $1,000 per unit in January 2017 “to almost $20,000” in December 2017, then went back
down); Tressie McMillan Cottom, Crypto and the Power of Folk Economics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/07/opinion/crypto-nfts-folk-economics.html (“[C]rypto is volatile.”);
Vigna, supra note 83 (“The price of the digital currency has surged about 90% in 2020 . . . .”). See Megan
McDermott, The Crypto Quandary: Is Bankruptcy Ready?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1921, 1945 (2021)
(discussing the “extreme volatility in the price of Bitcoin”); id. at 1946 (discussing “the high volatility
of crypto assets”); Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Surges Into 2021, Rose Nearly 20% over Weekend, WALL. ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-surges-into-2021-rose-nearly-20-over-weekend-11609779024
(Jan. 4, 2021, 6:14 PM) (“A correction of sorts did occur, again illustrating the volatility of the asset
class. After bitcoin hit its new high, the price fell 15% . . . .”).
85
McDermott, supra note 84, at 1940 (“[C]rypto assets . . . often present an illusionary facade of
liquidity.”).
86
Ryan Browne, Crypto Investors ‘Should Be Prepared to Lose All Their Money,’ Top UK
Regulator Warns, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/11/crypto-investors-risk-losing-all-theirmoney-uks-fca-warns.html (Jan. 11, 2021, 12:14 PM) (“That’s the message from the U.K.’s Financial
Conduct Authority, which on Monday warned investments and lending products related to crypto come
with ‘very high risks.’ . . . ‘If consumers invest in these types of product, they should be prepared to lose
all their money.’”); Tom Wilson, Anna Irrera & Jessica DiNapoli, Rush to Bitcoin? Not So Fast, Say
Keepers of Corporate Coffers, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto-currency-bitcointreasury-insi/rush-to-bitcoin-not-so-fast-say-keepers-of-corporate-coffers-idUSKBN2B00FY (Mar. 8,
2021, 1:09 AM) (“[M]any finance executives and accountants loath to risk balance sheets and reputations
on a highly volatile and unpredictable asset that confounds convention.”).
87
Investor Alert: Virtual Currency Risks, OFF. OF N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN.,
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/crypto-investor-notice.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
88
Paul Kiernan, SEC Calls for Tools to Rein In Crypto Markets, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2021, at A1.
89
After Bitcoin, both the aggregate value and the daily trading volume of other cryptocurrencies
dropped significantly. For example, Tether, on October 4, 2020, had a market capitalization somewhat
greater than $15 billion with a daily trading volume of slightly over $29 billion. Historical Snapshot - 04
October 2020, supra note 83. See David Segal, Going for Broke in Cryptoland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2021, at BU1 (discussing “hype coins”).
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SEC-compliant mutual fund or similar device which permits grass roots
investors90 to hold or aggregate cryptocurrencies.91
In light of Bitcoin’s novelty, it comes as no surprise that there is no
cognizable investment in cryptocurrency by the professional managers of
defined benefit plans.92 Given the similarities of defined benefit
arrangements and 401(k) plans as retirement savings accumulation devices,
significant investment by professional defined benefit trustees is a minimum
threshold of general acceptability that an investment category must pass
before it can be offered prudently to 401(k) participants. Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies today do not meet that threshold.
Cryptocurrency advocates suggest that defined benefit plans are starting
to invest in Bitcoin, at least as part of bundled funds.93 However, the
fiduciary rule of prudence requires extensive experience and acceptance
before an investment can be deemed objectively prudent.
Until defined benefit plans widely embrace Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies for a significant period of time and in significant volume
(as such plans have adopted real estate investments, hedge funds, and private
equity investments), 401(k) plans should avoid offering Bitcoin and
cryptocurrencies to 401(k) participants. It is possible, though not inevitable,
that Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies will, at some point in the future, cross the
threshold to prudence by establishing a sufficient track record and by
90
See, e.g., SEC Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1,
Release No. 34-88284 (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2020/34-88284.pdf
(denying permission to list and trade the United States Bitcoin and Treasury Investment Trust). There
are hedge funds that invest in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, but these funds are restricted to
accredited investors and are not available to rank-and-file investors. See, e.g., Morgan Creek Blockchain
Opportunities Fund II, LP, Notice of Exempt Offering of Securities (Form D) (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://sec.report/Document/0000919574-19-006488. See also The Digital Asset Index Fund, MORGAN
CREEK DIGIT. ASSETS WITH BITWISE, https://digitalassetindexfund.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2021)
(“Investors must be accredited and U.S.-based.”); Michael Wursthorn, Another Bitcoin Futures ETF
Bites the Dust, WALL STREET J., (Nov. 11, 2021, 3:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/anotherbitcoin-futures-etf-bites-the-dust-11636663692.
91
Leah McGrath Goodman, Wall Street’s Crypto Cold War, INSTITUTIONAL INV . (July 24,
2020), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1mmvg200ctlr0/Wall-Street-s-Crypto-Cold-War.
See also SEC Order Setting Aside Action by Delegated Authority and Disapproving a Proposed Rule
Change, Release No. 34-83723 (July 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/3483723.pdfhttps://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf (rejecting the rule change “to list and
trade shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust”); Kate Rooney & Bob Pisani, Winklevoss Twins Bitcoin
ETF Rejected by SEC, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/winklevoss-twins-bitcoin-etfrejected-by-sec.html (July 27, 2018, 7:53 AM).
92
See Michael del Castillo, Police Pension Backs Morgan Creek’s $40 Million Blockchain
Venture Capital Fund, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldelcastillo
/2019/02/12/police-pensions-back-40-million--blockchain-venture-capital-fund/?sh=681927d911ae
(noting that, when two public pensions invested in a bitcoin hedge fund, it was considered newsworthy
and “unusual”).
93
Sam Bourgi, Pension Funds Are Getting in on Bitcoin, According to Grayscale,
COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 8, 2021), https://cointelegraph.com/news/pension-funds-are-getting-in-onbitcoin-according-to-grayscale.
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achieving broad enough acceptance to be deemed conventional in the
defined benefit universe. But, that has not yet happened, and there is no
guarantee that it will.
Some investors have made and will continue to make money trading
Bitcoin. Some investors made money on tulips also. The fact-based inquiry
for objective prudence is whether Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have
today achieved general acceptance94 as conservative95 and cautious96
investments. For 401(k) participants, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are
today, as a factual matter, not objectively prudent as an investment class.
This conclusion reinforces my concerns about brokerage windows97
for rank-and-file 401(k) participants, as such windows may permit and
sometimes encourage cryptocurrency investments. Robinhood.com, for
example, proclaims cryptocurrency investments as one of its core
products. 98 A brokerage window through this or any similar site could
result in unsophisticated 401(k) participants making overconcentrated
investments in cryptocurrencies.
Art has long been a traditional holding of the wealthy and powerful, and
it remains so today.99 Important contemporary voices call for broader
embrace of art as an investment category.100 However, funds facilitating art
investment are, like Bitcoin, a new phenomenon. There is no publicly traded
device by which investors can hold art. There are a relative handful of
illiquid, privately held art funds organized as limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.101 By one account, there exist “fewer than
[sixty]” such art funds, with assets worth $830 million.102 There is no
evidence of professional defined benefit trustees investing in art.

94

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–5(e)(4)(i) (2021).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (AM . L. INST. 2007).
96
Id. § 90 cmt. e.
97
See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
98
ROBINHOOD, https://robinhood.com/us/en/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2021) (listing “Our Products”
as cash management, stocks and funds, options, gold, and crypto).
99
See, e.g., Emma Snover, Note, Casting Light on the Shade: Using Securities Laws to Draw New
Contours in Art Investment Regulation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1511 (2020) (discussing the size of
the global and domestic U.S. art market).
100
Adriano Picinati di Torcello, Why Should Art Be Considered as an Asset Class?, DELOITTE,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/artandfinance/lu-artasset-class-122012.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2022). Even if art does become a prudent investment class for
401(k) menus, Internal Revenue Code section 408(m) will discourage participants from investing their
accounts directly in art since such direct investments will constitute taxable distributions. Arguably,
section 408(m) would not be triggered by indirect art investments made via bundled investment
arrangements or similar holding devices.
101
Karen Hube, Future Returns: Art Funds Draw Few Investors, but Some Are Worth a Look,
BARRON’S: PENTA (Apr. 23, 2019, 11:44 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/art-funds-draw-fewinvestors-but-some-are-worth-a-look-01556034302.
102
Id.
95
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In short, no prudent fiduciary could today view art funds as sufficiently
accepted to be cautious and conservative investments for 401(k) menus.
B. ESG Funds
Like Bitcoin and art, ESG investments do not, as a class, qualify as
prudent for 401(k) investment menus, in light of the failure of defined
benefit trustees to embrace ESG investments as an asset category and in light
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which precludes the use of trust funds to
obtain benefits for third parties. A particular investment touted as an ESG
asset may be financially prudent despite its ESG label. But, ESG assets as a
class are not an objectively prudent category for 401(k) investment menus,
given the failure of defined benefit trustees to embrace such investments as
a class for retirement savings purposes. An asset packaged as an ESG
investment may, as an economic matter, qualify for a 401(k) menu. If so, it
is despite, not because of, the asset’s ESG imprimatur.
The forerunners in the pension-setting of ESG investments were
“economically targeted investments” (ETIs).103 The proponents of ETIs
argued that pension assets achieving market rates of return can be deployed
to generate positive economic externalities, such as jobs or community
development, that would otherwise not occur.104 The opponents of ETIs105
retorted that deploying pension assets to benefit third parties violates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the pension participants whose retirement is the
“exclusive purpose”106 for which plan assets should be invested. To permit
consideration of alleged ETI benefits for third parties threatens the integrity
of the fiduciary decision-making process by introducing into that process
concerns other than the welfare of the pension participants.107

103
Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 39, 39 (1997); Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically
Targeted Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB . L. 333, 334–36 (1995); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Continuing Battle over Economically Targeted
Investments: An Analysis of the Department of Labor’s Interpretative Bulletin 2015-01, 2016 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 197, 197–98, reprinted in 2017 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 4 (Kathryn J. Kennedy ed.) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Continuing
Battle]; Jean-Pierre Aubry et al., ESG Investing and Public Pensions: An Update, 74 CTR. FOR RET. RSCH.,
Oct. 2020, at 1, 2, (discussing “economically targeted investments” by pensions as an early form of “social
investing”); Feuer, supra note 61, § 6.03[4] (discussing economically targeted investments).
104
Aubry et al., supra note 103, at 2. See also Paul Sullivan, Jon Bon Jovi, the Jersey Shore and
the Impact Investing Strategy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/yourmoney/jon-bon-jovi-the-jersey-shore-and-the-impact-investing-strategy.html (describing interest in
“investments [that] perform a social good—housing for displaced residents or financing for local
businesses—while also earning a return close to the market rate”).
105
Of which I was one. See generally Zelinsky, Continuing Battle, supra note 103, at 19798.
106
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
107
Bernard S. Sharfman, ESG Investing Under ERISA, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 112, 130–32 (2020).
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Moreover, the critique continued, ETIs cannot alter the economy’s
allocation of resources, as promised.108 If an externality-generating
investment yields a market rate of return, another investor will make that
investment even if the ETI-seeking investor does not.109 The hallmark of a
market-rate investment is that it is an investment the market will fund.110 At
the end of the day, the pursuit of ETIs is a game of musical chairs, which,
while it shuffles ownership, does not alter the overall allocation of resources
among investments that yield market-rate returns.111
In an apparent response to the critique that the ETI search for third party
benefits violates the duty of loyalty to pension participants, ESG investing
is, as Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff observe, today often promoted
as generating higher returns for the investor.112
Other harbingers of ESG investing are mutual funds that reflect religious
values. The GuideStone Funds, for example, eschew companies “whose
products, services or activities are publicly recognized as being incompatible
with the moral and ethical posture” of Christian values.113 These companies
to be avoided on religious grounds include firms “in the alcohol, tobacco,
gambling, pornography or abortion industries.”114 The Timothy Plan is
another organization which offers “[i]nvesting with [b]iblical [p]rinciples.”115
Individuals investing their own nonpension funds are undoubtedly free
to pursue whatever noneconomic goals are important to them.116 It is their
money they are investing. And, as we have just seen, what is more
controversial is whether value-driven investing, pursued under the ESG
label or under another rubric, actually alters market-based outcomes.117

108

Zelinsky, Continuing Battle, supra note 103, at 205–06.
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 42, at 388–89 (explaining that proponents of ESG investing
today assert “that ESG investing could improve risk-adjusted returns, thereby providing a direct benefit
to investors”); id. at 454 (“[S]o much of the debate has centered on the claim that ESG investing can
provide superior risk-adjusted returns.”). See also Aubry et al., supra note 103, at 1 (“Proponents believe
that, by integrating these ESG factors into existing methods of financial analysis, investors can both earn
higher returns and promote socially beneficial practices and outcomes.”).
113
How We Invest, GUIDESTONE FUNDS, http://www.guidestonefunds.com/How-We-Invest (last
visited Feb. 2, 2022).
114
Id.
115
About Us, TIMOTHY PLAN, https://timothyplan.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2022). See also Feuer,
supra note 61, § 6.03[2] (discussing “faith-based” funds).
116
See, e.g., Feuer, supra note 61, § 6.02[1] (“[I]f the investor is an individual investing his or her
funds, the only ethical-factor investing constraints are those that the individual chooses to follow.”).
117
See, e.g., Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 42, at 433–53. See also Paul Brest, Ronald J.
Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value, 44 J. CORP. L. 205,
222 (2018) (“When one investor sells her stock in a publicly-traded company, tautologically another
investor takes his place.”); id. at 223 (“[T]he sale of publicly traded stock alone will have little direct
economic consequences.”); Zelinsky, Continuing Battle, supra note 103, at 199–206.
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But, these issues, as important and interesting as they are, are not
controlling in the context of ERISA’s duties of prudence and loyalty. Under
these legal tests, the fiduciary’s focus must be whether an investment is
generally accepted and therefore deemed cautious and conservative and
whether an investment is pursued exclusively to provide retirement benefits
for plan participants.
Here, the evidence is, at best, mixed. Many corporations, funds, and
investment managers today proclaim their concern for ESG goals. While
public sector pension plans have invested heavily in ESG funds as a result
of political pressures, private sector defined benefit trustees have not
embraced ESG investments as such.118 There is, moreover, no real track
record demonstrating that, for the long-run, ESG investing as a class
outperforms investing based on traditional economic criteria.119 As
Professors Schanzenbach and Sitkoff observe, there is a serious prospect that
ESG funds will be overvalued by ideologically-motivated purchasers
bidding up the prices of such funds.120 Such overvaluation makes ESG funds
unattractive targets for those prudently investing for economic returns.121
A potential counterargument is that ESG funds are like target date
funds,122 incremental adaptations of conventional mutual funds. From this
vantage, the historic experience of the mutual fund industry can be tacked
onto ESG funds to give them a longer provenance and thus a greater claim
to prudence.
There is, however, great tension between this defense of ESG investing
as an incremental extension of long-standing mutual fund practice and the
claims of ESG advocates that they are doing something new, indeed,
revolutionary. Both claims cannot be true. It cannot be that ESG investing is
objectively prudent because it is not greatly different from existing mutual
funds, but that ESG investing is simultaneously compelling because it is a
break with the past.
In short, under present circumstances, the ERISA-based duties of loyalty
and prudence preclude the placement of ESG funds as a class onto 401(k)
investment menus.

118
Aubry et al., supra note 103, at 3 (“[N]one of the institutional ESG assets are held by private sector
defined benefit plans.”); Staff, Few U.S. Pension Plans Integrating ESG Into Investment Manager
Selections: Survey, BENEFITS CAN. (July 26, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.benefitscanada.com/news/fewu-s-pension-plans-integrating-esg-into-investment-manager-selections-survey/.
119
Aubry et al., supra note 103, at 6 (“The fact that having an ESG policy is also negatively related
to returns (with 10-percent significance) appears to contradict the assertion that focusing on social factors
produces market or better returns.”).
120
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 42, at 452.
121
Id.
122
See Fisch, supra note 63, at 2022–35.
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This conclusion is reinforced by DOL regulations amplifying these
fiduciary duties.123 In three ways, these regulations discourage ESG
investing for 401(k) purposes. These regulations prohibit the use of
ERISA-regulated funds to pursue nonfinancial goals. In addition, these DOL
rules limit the use of nonfinancial objectives as tie-breaking factors when
investments are equally attractive in financial terms. Finally, these new
regulations completely preclude from “qualified default investment
alternatives” any fund or investment that styles itself as pursuing
nonfinancial goals, such as ESG objectives.
While the earlier proposed version of these regulations explicitly
addressed ESG investing in the pension context,124 the final regulations as
adopted drop any overt reference to ESG investing and instead differentiate
“pecuniary”125 from “non-pecuniary”126 factors. Despite this change, the final
regulations discourage pension plans from ESG investing by barring such
plans from pursuing social benefits in the selection of 401(k) investment
menus. Under the regulations, any investment, including an ESG investment,
must be justified solely by financial benefits to the plan participants.
The final DOL regulations follow Dudenhoeffer127 and declare that an
ERISA “fiduciary’s evaluation of an investment or investment course of
action must be based only on pecuniary factors.”128 Reinforcing this
admonition, the regulations further warn that “[a] fiduciary may not
subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in their
retirement income or financial benefits under the plan to other objectives,
and may not sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk
to promote non-pecuniary benefits or goals.”129 These provisions preclude
consideration of ESG or similar factors when investing ERISA-regulated
assets except when such factors generate financial benefits (as ESG
advocates contend they do and as ESG skeptics deny they can).
The regulations confirm the DOL’s long-standing position that
“non-pecuniary factors” may serve as tie-breaking “deciding factor[s]” when
“investment alternatives” cannot be “distinguish[ed] on the basis of pecuniary
factors alone.”130 However, the regulations further provide that, in such a
tie-breaking situation, the “the chosen non-pecuniary factor or factors [must

123
See generally Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39,113 (proposed
June 30, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
124
Id. at 39,114.
125
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(c)(1) (2021).
126
Id.
127
Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 420–21 (2014).
128
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(c)(1) (2021).
129
Id.
130
Id. § 2550.404a-1(c)(2); see also Zelinsky, Continuing Battle, supra note 103, at 20105.
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be] consistent with the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their
retirement income or financial benefits under the plan.”131
This statement is not a model of clarity. However, it places additional, even
if ambiguous, restraints on the use of nonfinancial considerations, such as ESG
factors, for tie-breaking among otherwise perfectly balanced investments.
In a third constraint on ESG investing by ERISA plans, the DOL
regulations explicitly bar participant-directed individual account plans from
including in their “qualified default investment alternative[s]” any investment
“if its investment objectives or goals or its principal investment strategies
include, consider, or indicate the use of one or more non-pecuniary factors.”132
Under these regulations, a mutual fund otherwise yielding appropriate
economic benefits for participants can be added to a 401(k) menu even if the
fund’s manager considers ESG characteristics. However, those ESG
characteristics themselves may not motivate the trustee’s selection of an
investment except in a tie-breaking situation. Even then, the 401(k) trustee
must, inter alia, document how the tie-breaking “non-pecuniary factor or
factors are consistent with the interests of participants and beneficiaries in
their retirement income or financial benefits under the plan.”133
The proposed version of these regulations attracted the ire of ESG
advocates. Attorney Albert Feuer, for example, criticized the proposed
regulations as precluding ESG investing by ERISA-regulated plans and as
lacking any legal basis.134
For those embracing the pro-ESG vantage, this criticism carries over to
the final regulations since, under those regulations as adopted, consideration
of “non-pecuniary factors,” such as ESG concerns, can, at most, be used for
tie-breaking and can never be used for qualified default investment
alternatives.135 While there is some play at the joints, on balance, 401(k)
trustees, under the final version of the regulations, must carefully scrutinize
investments packaged in or driven by ESG values to ensure that
conventional economic benefits are advanced by those investments.136 ESG
considerations as such cannot motivate a trustee’s decision to place or keep
an investment on the 401(k) menu she constructs or monitors.137 It is thus
unlikely that the proponents of ESG investing will be happier about the final
version of these DOL regulations than they were about the proposed version.

131

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(c)(2)(iii) (2021).
Id. § 2550.404a-1(d)(2)(ii).
133
Id. § 2550.404a-1(c)(2)(iii).
134
Albert Feuer, INSIGHT: DOL Lacks a Convincing Legal Basis for Attempts to Discourage
ESG/Sustainable Investing, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 18, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/d
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Signaling its displeasure with these regulations, the Biden
administration has proposed major revisions.138 But, even if these
regulations are ultimately withdrawn or modified, ESG funds as such are
today not objectively prudent as an investment class, i.e., generally accepted
and thus cautious and conservative.139 Defined benefit trustees have so far
eschewed ESG investments as a class.140 Defined benefit plan trustees are
the gatekeepers for 401(k) investing. The failure of defined benefit
fiduciaries to accept ESG investing precludes the placement of ESG funds
as a category onto 401(k) investment menus.
An ERISA-regulated trustee might find that a particular investment
serves the financial interests of plan participants even though the investment
considers ESG factors. But, third-party benefits cannot motivate trustees to
place investments onto 401(k) investment menus since the duty of loyalty
requires that the sole consideration for an ERISA plan’s investment choices
be the financial benefits for the participants’ retirements.141
Here, again, it is necessary to distinguish between a trustee’s personal
investment decisions for his own portfolio and his obligations of loyalty and
prudence as an ERISA fiduciary. The trustee can invest his own personal
money however he chooses. But, as a 401(k) fiduciary, he must construct
the participants’ investment menu within the strictures of prudence,
diversification, and loyalty.142 As understood today, those strictures leave no
room for ESG investments as an asset class, in light of the failure of defined
benefit trustees to embrace ESG investments as a category and the
impropriety under the duty of loyalty of using ERISA-regulated funds to
benefit third parties.
C. Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds
A “hedge fund” is an actively managed pool of capital that, by making
relatively risky investments, promises purportedly sophisticated investors143
higher returns than can be achieved by the more conventional investing
138
Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder Rights, 86 Fed.
Reg. 57,272 (Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550). For my criticism of these proposed
regulations, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising
Shareholder Rights (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3974783).
139
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
140
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-398, RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTING:
CLEARER INFORMATION ON CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE
FACTORS WOULD BE HELPFUL 13 (2018).
141
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
142
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
143
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strategies available to the general public. Whereas a typical mutual fund
or ETF buys and holds stocks and bonds, hedge funds often invest in more
complicated financial transactions (e.g., short sales and leveraged
transactions)145 using less conventional instruments (e.g., options,
derivatives, futures, total return swaps, and credit default swaps).146 Hedge
funds often operate opaquely in the belief that their proprietary investment
strategies are best kept under wraps, even from the investors financing
them.147 Many hedge fund investors make their respective investments
through “fund of funds” that purchase portfolios of different hedge funds.148
There is skepticism of hedge funds in important quarters. In 2007, Warren
Buffett made a public bet that a passively-invested S&P 500 index fund
would, over ten years, beat the performance of a group of hedge funds selected
by his betting counterparty.149 Buffett easily won the bet.150 A consistent
theme of hedge fund critics is that the fees paid to managers of these funds are
inordinate, decreasing the net returns received by investors.151 Among other
contentions, the critique asserts that managers’ fees, nominally tied to fund
performance, are in fact a one-way street.152 While hedge fund managers are
amply compensated when hedge funds experience gains, these managers do
not return this compensation if the funds subsequently decline in value.153 Socalled “high water mark” provisions prevent a manager from receiving further
compensation until the now lower fund she manages returns to its previous
high.154 However, if the fund is liquidated below that high water mark or if the
investor leaves the fund while its valuation is below that mark, the investor
144
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will have earlier paid management fees for investment performance she no
longer possesses.155
The fee issue is compounded in the context of a fund of funds since a
second set of fees is paid to the managers of the fund of funds on top of the
fees paid to the managers of the underlying hedge funds.156 Hedge funds may
also pose liquidity issues for their investors as a result of “lock up”
provisions which authorize the fund to block investors from withdrawing
their investments.157 The much-publicized losses incurred by hedge funds
from their short-sales of GameStop and other stocks illustrated the risks
associated with hedge funds’ financial strategies.158
While Warren Buffett avoids hedge funds, many investors embrace them.
Most importantly for 401(k) purposes, large defined benefit plans, on average,
invest roughly ten percent of their respective portfolios in hedge funds and
similar “alternative” investments such as private equity and derivatives.159
Hedge funds thus highlight again that a class of investments may be
sufficiently accepted to be prudent for 401(k) menus even if the trustee
herself would not invest in that class personally. Hedge funds also highlight
the question of how general acceptance must be for prudence purposes: Are
hedge funds “generally accepted” when America’s iconic investor warns
against them?
The liquidity, diversification, and secrecy issues raised by hedge funds
are better handled by professional defined benefit trustees than by
rank-and-file 401(k) investors. For a large, well-diversified defined benefit
plan, a lock-up provision preventing the immediate withdrawal of funds may
be a minor nuisance. For a small 401(k) investor on the verge of retirement,
such a lock-up may be a financial disaster, particularly if the investor has
made an overly large commitment to a fund and cannot currently liquidate
his investment to meet his personal needs or to satisfy the Internal Revenue
Code’s required minimum distribution test.160
The minimum investments required by most hedge funds161 pose another
155
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quandary for a 401(k) plan seeking to offer to its participants a hedge fund
(or a fund of funds) as an investment option. It might require many
participants to invest in the fund for their cumulative investments to satisfy
such a minimum.
There is, at its core, a dilemma when assessing the prudence of hedge
funds as 401(k) investments choices. Prudent investing is cautious and
conservative.162 A hedge fund promises greater returns precisely because it
is not cautious and conservative, but rather embraces risky, often illiquid,
and frequently secret investment strategies not available to the general
public.163 But, hedge funds have become so widely accepted in the defined
benefit context as to be conventional in that context.164
The dilemma is mitigated if the particular investment offered to a 401(k)
investor is a diversified fund of hedge funds or if the hedge fund is bundled
into an investment package with assets from other investment categories.165
There may also be more liquidity when a hedge fund (or a fund of funds)
trades in a secondary market as they sometimes do.166 On the other hand, a
fund of funds involves a second set of management fees.
In the end, hedge funds represent a closer prudence call than does real
estate. On balance, hedge funds, including funds of funds, have so penetrated
the defined benefit universe as to be an acceptably prudent class of
investments for 401(k) menus, so long as investments in such funds are
limited to prevent unsophisticated participants from concentrating too
heavily in them. Particular hedge fund investments offered to 401(k)
participants must be selected with care and attention to the questions of fees,
diversification, liquidity, and required minimum investments. But, as a class,
hedge funds are generally accepted in the defined benefit world and thus
constitute an asset class meeting the legal threshold of prudence, given their
wide acceptance by defined benefit managers, as well as the possibility of
investing diversely and with liquidity through funds of funds and through
investments that bundle hedge funds with other asset classes.
Similar observations are to be made about private equity funds. The
premise of private equity is that higher returns can be achieved by investing
outside established markets.167 Such an investment can be made as a direct
investment in a private equity fund or by holding a fund of private equity
funds. Prominent voices are skeptical of private equity as an investment
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class. Here, again, the Oracle of Omaha is among the outspoken. But,
defined benefit plans have embraced private equity as a now conventional
investment category.169 By virtue of that wide embrace, private equity today
passes the prudence threshold as an investment class.170
A particular private equity investment choice, like any other 401(k)
investment option, must be vetted individually for its fees, diversification,
and liquidity before it is offered to 401(k) participants. Again, the 401(k)
trustee who concludes that a private equity option may prudently be offered
to the plan’s participants may not find that choice appropriate for her own
personal portfolio.
As was the case with REITs, there is a significant danger that
unsophisticated 401(k) participants will overinvest in hedge and private equity
funds. This possibility indicates that the ERISA fiduciary placing and keeping
such funds in a 401(k) investment menu should, in the interests of
diversification, limit the amount any participant may invest in such funds—just
as defined benefit trustees invest limited amounts of their respective portfolios
in these alternative investments. Diversification considerations also suggest that
the best way to make hedge and private equity funds available to 401(k)
participants may be as part of bundled investment packages that include more
conventional investments as the bulk of the packages.
Instead of, or in addition to, such bundling, 401(k) plans should impose
a reasonable limit (e.g., ten percent) on the percentage of the participant’s
account that she may hold as hedge and private equity funds. Besides
protecting against overconcentration in hedge and private equity funds, such
a limit would signal to the participant the importance of diversifying her
retirement investments.

168
Hema Parmar & Sonali Basak, Private Equity’s Returns Questioned, This Time by Buffett,
BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-05/private-equity-s-returns-questionedagain-this-time-by-buffett (May 6, 2019, 10:23 AM) (“‘We have seen a number of proposals from private
equity funds where the returns are really not calculated in a manner that I would regard as honest,’
Buffett, 88, said Saturday[,] May 4 at Berkshire’s annual shareholder meeting in Omaha, Neb. ‘It’s not
as good as it looks.’”).
169
See PANIS & BRIEN, supra note 13, at 2, 6; National Data, supra note 159 (showing that state
and local pension plans invest 9.3% of their assets in private equity); Mary Williams Walsh, Marching
Orders for the Next Investment Chief of CalPERS: More Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/19/business/calpers-pension-private-equity.html.
170
See Campagna Letter, supra note 44, at 5 (concluding that ERISA section 404 is not violated
“solely because the fiduciary offers a professionally managed asset allocation fund with a private equity
component”). But see U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT
ON PRIVATE EQUITY IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN DESIGNATED INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES 3
(Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resourcecenter/information-letters/06-03-2020-supplemental-statement.pdf (“The Department cautions against
application of the [Campagna] Letter outside of that context.”).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

544

[Vol. 54:2

III. FURTHER ISSUES
The foregoing analysis suggests five additional questions a 401(k)
trustee might confront when constructing for plan participants an investment
menu which includes alternative investments. First, if a particular alternative
asset class is prudent for 401(k) purposes (e.g., REITs), must an investment
from that class be included in the plan’s investment menu? Looking to the
relevant DOL regulations and the more general duty of loyalty, the answer
is a qualified “no.”
To trigger the fiduciary protections of ERISA section 404(c),171 a
participant-directed 401(k) investment menu must offer to the plan’s
participants a “broad range of investment alternatives.”172 As few as three
investments can satisfy this regulatory requirement of breadth, as long as, inter
alia, each investment choice is itself internally “diversified” and “has materially
different risk and return characteristics” from the other two choices.173
If these tests are met, there is no regulatory requirement that the entire
universe of prudent asset classes be represented in any menu of investment
choices. Thus, for example, an investment menu for 401(k) participants
consisting of three different packages of mutual funds, ETFs, and cash
equivalents could be diversified and could embody different risk and return
characteristics without including real estate. This menu would satisfy the
regulation’s test of a “broad range” of investment choices even though this
menu avoids real estate.
The qualification to this conclusion is that all decisions of an
ERISA-regulated fiduciary must independently meet the statutory test of
loyalty.174 Thus, a trustee’s decision to eschew real estate (or any other
prudent investment class) must be exclusively motivated by the financial
interests of the plan’s participants in providing for their retirements. A
trustee could not construct a 401(k) investment menu without a real estate
option if the trustee was motivated, not by the participants’ economic
interests, but, for example, by animus toward a former spouse in the real
estate industry.
With that qualification, a 401(k) investment menu can encompass a
“broad range” of choices without offering an alternative from each and every
prudent asset class. Including prudent alternative investments is a permitted
choice, not a mandatory requirement.175 If a trustee concludes that properly
limited or bundled investments in REITs or in hedge and private equity
funds will enhance 401(k) participants’ retirement benefits, such
investments can legitimately be included among the participants’ options.
But, such investments are not obligatory.
171
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Second, could a 401(k) plan make certain investments available to some,
but not all, participants in the plan? Could, for example, a plan permit some
participants to invest in hedge funds or through a brokerage window, only if
these participants first pass a test establishing their financial sophistication? This
kind of approach is possible, but it is not easily accomplished given the Internal
Revenue Code’s nondiscrimination rules governing qualified plans.176
Just as fiduciary duty is an overriding theme of the ERISA provisions
governing pension plans,177 nondiscrimination is a fundamental premise of the
portions of the Internal Revenue Code regulating pensions.178 For this purpose,
the Code distinguishes between “highly compensated” and “nonhighly
compensated” employees179 and mandates that pensions may not discriminate
in their “contributions or benefits . . . in favor” of the former.180 In 2022, the
dividing line between highly compensated employees and nonhighly
compensated employees was an annual compensation of $135,000.181
Implementing the statute, the Treasury regulations mandate that, under
a plan, “[t]he right to direct investments” and “[t]he right to a particular form
of investment” cannot discriminate in favor of the sponsoring employer’s
highly compensated employees.182 Impermissible discrimination is deemed
to exist unless such right extends to a percentage of nonhighly compensated
employees, which is at least seventy percent of the percentage of highly
compensated employees enjoying such right.183
To see the practical challenges caused by this scheme, consider an
employer that sponsors a 401(k) plan, covering all of the employer’s
personnel. Suppose that there are one hundred highly compensated
employees and one hundred nonhighly compensated employees, all of
whom participate in the 401(k) arrangement. Suppose further that the
employer desires to offer a brokerage window only to financially
sophisticated employees and administers a test for such sophistication. Let
us further assume that fifty highly compensated employees pass the test for
financial sophistication (and are thus offered the brokerage window) and that
twenty nonhighly compensated employees pass.
On these assumptions, the plan fails the Internal Revenue Code’s
nondiscrimination standard; the percentage of nonhighly compensated
employees qualifying for the brokerage window (twenty percent) is only
forty percent of the percentage of highly compensated employees (fifty
percent) qualifying as financially knowledgeable. If, however, thirty-five
nonhighly compensated employees clear the test for financial sophistication,
176
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the arrangement limiting the brokerage window to knowledgeable
participants passes muster under the Code’s nondiscrimination rules since
thirty-five percent is seventy percent of the percentage of the highly
compensated employees (fifty percent) clearing the test for financial
knowledge and thus achieving access to the brokerage window.
From the employer’s perspective, two problems emerge in this context.
First, the employer contemplating this (or a similar) proposal—e.g.,
extending the right to invest in hedge funds only to employees who pass a
test of financial sophistication—does not know in advance if enough
nonhighly compensated employees will pass the test to qualify under the
Code’s nondiscrimination standard. Second, even if enough nonhighly
compensated employees initially pass the test for financial sophistication,
there is no guarantee that the Code’s nondiscrimination standard will
continue to be met on an ongoing basis in the future. If, for example, a
nonhighly compensated but financially sophisticated employee quits and is
replaced by a similarly low-paid employee who flunks the test of financial
sophistication, then the policy will fail the Internal Revenue Code’s
nondiscrimination norm since thirty-four percent (the percentage of the
nonhighly compensated employees demonstrating financial sophistication)
falls just short of the necessary participation rate (thirty-five percent) for the
nonhighly compensated employees.
An employer who accepts these vagaries of the Code’s
nondiscrimination rules could make some options available only to certain
employees. However, this employer would need to continually monitor
compliance with the Code’s nondiscrimination standard and be prepared to
change the policy if that standard is failed at some point in the future.
Third, is it possible that the limits on alternative investments I
recommend impermissibly intrude upon the participants’ control of the
investments in their respective accounts?184 As a statutory matter, section
404(c) protects a fiduciary from liability “for any loss”185 that results if a
participant exercises “control over the assets in his account.”186 The
employee’s control, the argument would go, is impaired by a ten percent (or
similar) limit on investments in a particular class. Indeed, the purpose of
such a limit is to constrain the participant’s control to prevent her from
overconcentrating her retirement investments in hedge funds or another
prudent but alternative investment class.
From this vantage, once a 401(k) trustee determines that a particular
investment category or a particular investment is, as a factual matter,
sufficiently accepted to be prudent, the responsibility for diversification
184
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185
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186
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shifts to the participant who “control[s]” decisions within the prudent
investment menu. One way of interpreting the relevant statutes and
regulations is that an ERISA fiduciary is, as a matter of prudence,
responsible for constructing the 401(k) menu and that the job of
diversification is delegated solely to the participant via her control of her
investment allocations within that menu. Under this reading of the statutes
and regulations, a trustee who limits a participant’s ability to invest more of
her account in a particular asset class has, for section 404(c) purposes,
unacceptably impaired the participant’s control of her account.
However, this argument overlooks the overlapping legal relationship
between the duties of prudence and diversification. The law does not
dichotomize responsibility for these two duties. Rather, a prudent trustee, as
part of her prudence duties, must concern herself with diversification as an
aspect of prudence.
While ERISA recognizes diversification as a free-standing fiduciary
mandate in its own right, diversification is also an element of the prudence
requirement.188 A prudent menu is one constructed considering diversification.
A 401(k) trustee cannot relegate diversification concerns to the participants
who control their accounts per section 404(c). It is imprudent to ignore the
danger that unsophisticated 401(k) participants will overconcentrate their
retirement savings in particular asset categories. A prudent trustee is
necessarily sensitive to diversification concerns. Such concerns can be
prudently addressed by the kinds of limits I have suggested for at least some
alternative investment categories to prevent unsophisticated 401(k) participants
from overconcentrating their investments in these categories.
Fourth, my analysis emphasizes the role of defined benefit trustees as
gatekeepers for determining prudence for 401(k) purposes. Defined benefit
plans and 401(k) plans are “like” each other insofar as both enterprises
accumulate retirement savings.189 Acceptance by professional defined
benefit trustees of a particular investment category is a necessary condition
for establishing the prudence of that category for 401(k) purposes.
But, defined benefit plans are in a long run decline.190 Once, a majority
of qualified plan participants were covered by defined benefit plans.191
Today, 401(k) plans predominate.192 At some point in the future, private
sector defined benefit plans will be fossils. At that point, defined benefit
187

Id.
See supra pp. 521–22.
189
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
190
See ZELINSKY, supra note 45, at 31–34, 37, 44, 52, 57, 77, 91 (discussing the causes and
consequences of the rise of the defined contribution paradigm and the concomitant decline of defined
benefit pensions); John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Role in the Demise of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in
the United States (forthcoming).
191
See ZELINSKY, supra note 45, at 31–34, 37, 44, 52, 57, 77, 91.
192
Id.
188

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

548

[Vol. 54:2

trustees will no longer be prudence gatekeepers for 401(k) plans because
defined benefit trustees will no longer exist in substantial numbers.
As a long-term prognosis, the defined contribution paradigm will prevail
in the retirement savings universe, at least in the private sector.193 But, for
the short and intermediate runs, defined benefit plans will persist and will
hold significant financial assets. Thus, for now and for the foreseeable
future, professional trustees managing defined benefit funds serve as
gatekeepers for 401(k) prudence purposes. At some point in the future, the
continuing decline of defined benefit plans will make it necessary to revisit
this question, but that point in time is not imminent.194
Finally, it can be argued that the world is speeding up and therefore that
investments can meet the objective test of prudence in shorter time spans
than they did before. I contrast the sixty-year history of REITs with the much
shorter life of Bitcoins as part of my analysis that deems the former
objectively prudent, but the latter not.195 In contrast, the counterargument
would go, from the vantage of 2022, Bitcoin’s relatively short lifespan
reflects a faster-moving world and should thus carry greater weight when
assessing the prudence of Bitcoin as a 401(k) investment option.
Here, the tulip saga again raises a cautionary flag. No doubt, those in the
midst of the tulip mania thought they too were in a precedent shattering
world. Reflecting on their experience, I adhere to my conclusion: An
objectively prudent investment is one which is generally accepted and
therefore deemed cautious and conservative. More time should elapse and
more experience should occur before 401(k) trustees let participants invest
their retirement savings in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, if that should
ever occur.
CONCLUSION
Whether any category of alternative investments ought to be considered
for the menus offered to 401(k) participants is a fact-intensive question.
Central to this inquiry are ERISA’s legal tests of prudence, diversification,
and loyalty.196 These tests require such fact-driven inquiries as the
acceptability of a particular category of investments to investors in general
and to professional defined benefit trustees in particular, as well as the
trustee’s motivation for embracing such investments. Another important
concern when making this inquiry is the financial unsophistication of many,
perhaps most, 401(k) participants.
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REITs pass ERISA’s fiduciary tests because REITs now have a
considerable track record amassed over six decades and have achieved broad
acceptance, both among general investors and in the world of defined benefit
pensions. In contrast, art funds, Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies are today
not prudent to offer to 401(k) participants in light of such investments’ novelty
and the failure to date of defined benefit trustees to embrace such investments.
ESG funds are like art funds and Bitcoin in that they are not objectively
prudent under present circumstances and therefore are not appropriate as a
class for 401(k) investment menus. Hedge funds and private equity funds are
closer to REITs in light of the widespread acceptance of these funds by
defined benefit trustees. Consequently, as a class, such funds, if appropriately
limited, qualify as prudent for 401(k) menus even if the trustee would not
deploy his personal resources to such funds and even if some (perhaps many)
such funds examined individually fail ERISA’s fiduciary standards.
These determinations may change over time with new factual
circumstances, e.g., a greater acceptance of a particular asset class by investors,
including professional defined benefit trustees as gatekeepers for the 401(k)
universe, and the emergence of robust markets that provide more experience
with particular investment categories. But, the approach is ultimately what
counts, as the norms of prudence, loyalty, and diversification, applied to current
facts, govern the construction of 401(k) investment menus.

